Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.

Benedict de Spinoza,alphabet learning toys for 13 year olds under 20 dollars THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

Part II: ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results, which mustnecessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternaland infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved inPart i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in aninfinite number of ways), but only those which are able to leadus, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mindand its highest blessedness.

DEFINITIONS I. By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in acertain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as heis considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.Cor.)

II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and,which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; inother words, that without which the thing, and which itselfwithout the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

III. By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed bythe mind as a thinking thing.

>>>>>Explanation—I say 'conception' rather than perception,because the word perception seems to imply that the mind ispassive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems toexpress an activity of the mind.

IV. By 'an adequate idea,' I mean an idea which, in so far asit is considered in itself, without relation to the object, hasall the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

>>>>>Explanation—I say 'intrinsic,' in order to exclude thatmark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the ideaand its object (ideatum).

V. 'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing.

>>>>>Explanation—I say 'indefinite,' because it cannot bedetermined through the existence itself of the existing thing,or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existenceof the thing, but does not take it away.

VI. 'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms.

VII. By 'particular things,' I mean things which are finite andhave a conditioned existence; but if several individual thingsconcur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effectof one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particularthing.

AXIOMS I. The essence of man does not involve necessaryexistence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to passthat this or that man does or does not exist.

II. Man thinks.

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other ofthe passions, do not take place, unless there be in the sameindividual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the ideacan exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies andmodes of thought.

N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.xiii.

 PROPOSITIONS I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a
thinking thing.

>>>>>Proof—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, aremodes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the natureof God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Cor.). God therefore possesses theattribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved inall particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This proposition is also evident from the fact, thatwe are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, inproportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking morethoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality orperfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinitenumber of things in an infinite number of ways, is,necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore,from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinitebeing, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one ofthe infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extendedthing.

>>>>>Proof—The proof of this proposition is similar to that ofthe last.

III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of hisessence, but also of all things which necessarily follow fromhis essence.

>>>>>Proof—God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think aninfinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the samething, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now allthat is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea as we are consideringnecessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)

*****Note—The multitude understand by the power of God the freewill of God, and the right over all things that exist, whichlatter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. Forit is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and toreduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very oftenlikened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we haverefuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Cors. i. and ii.), and we haveshown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity,as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as itfollows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the samenecessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. Wefurther showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power isidentical with God's essence in action; therefore it is asimpossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceivehim as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, Icould point out, that the power which is commonly attributed toGod is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by themultitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves anegation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the sameground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, toturn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i.from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow mymeaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound thepower of God with the human power and right of kings.

IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of thingsfollow in infinite ways, can only be one.

>>>>>Proof—Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save theattributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Cor.). Therefore the ideaof God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infiniteways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in sofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as heis unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both ofthe attributes of God and of particular things do not own astheir efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the thingsperceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of thisPart. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the ideaof his essence, and of all things which follow necessarilytherefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not becausehe is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being ofideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being ofideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.xxv., Cor.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner thenature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attributeof God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effectof any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being ofideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as athinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in sofar as he is considered through the attribute of which they aremodes, and not in so far as he is considered through any otherattribute.

>>>>>Proof—Each attribute is conceived through itself, withoutany other part (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of eachattribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not ofany other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, onlyin so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modesthey are, and not in so far as he is considered through anyother. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence the actual being of things, which are notmodes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature,because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Thingsrepresented in ideas follow, and are derived from theirparticular attribute, in the same manner, and with the samenecessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) fromthe attribute of thought.

VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the orderand connection of things.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.For the idea of everything that is caused depends on aknowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence God's power of thinking is equal to hisrealized power of action— that is, whatsoever follows from theinfinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),follows without exception in the same order and connection fromthe idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

*****Note—Before going any further, I wish to recall to mindwhat has been pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can beperceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essenceof substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are oneand the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and theidea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressedin two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized bythose Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and thethings understood by God are identical. For instance, a circleexisting in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which isalso in God, are one and the same thing displayed throughdifferent attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under theattribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, orunder any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or oneand the same chain of causes—that is, the same things followingin either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea—for instance, of theidea of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of acircle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because theactual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as aproximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that againthrough another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as weconsider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the orderof the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, throughthe attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we considerthings as modes of extension, we must explain the order of thewhole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and soon, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things asthey are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as heconsists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the presentexplain my meaning more clearly.

VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do notexist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in thesame way as the formal essences of particular things or modesare contained in the attributes of God.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from the last; it isunderstood more clearly from the preceding note.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence, so long as particular things do notexist, except in so far as they are comprehended in theattributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas donot exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists;and when the particular things are said to exist, not only in sofar as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involveexistence, through which they are said to continue.

*****Note—If anyone desires an example to throw more light onthis question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour toillustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle issuch that if any number of straight lines intersect within it,the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to oneanother; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in acircle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist,except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any ofthese rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they arecomprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that,from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. Theideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they arecontained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguishedfrom the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is causedby God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he isconsidered as affected by another idea of a thing actuallyexisting, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affectedby a third idea, and so on to infinity.

>>>>>Proof—The idea of an individual thing actually existing isan individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes(by the Cor. and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (byProp. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as heis a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) inso far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far ashe is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and heis the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, andso on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is(by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connectionof causes. Therefore of a given individual idea anotherindividual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered asmodified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea Godis the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, andso on to infinity. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Whatsoever takes place in the individual objectof any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only ashe has the idea of the object.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, itsidea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as heis infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected byanother idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (byProp. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas isthe same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,therefore, of that which takes place in any individual objectwill be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of thatobject. Q.E.D.

X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence ofman—in other words, substance does not constitute the actualbeing (forma) of man.

>>>>>Proof—The being of substance involves necessary existence(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substanceappertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, manwould necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.Ax. i.). Therefore &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This proposition may also be proved from I.v., inwhich it is shown that there cannot be two substances of thesame nature; for as there may be many men, the being ofsubstance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties ofsubstance—namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows, that the essence of man isconstituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belongto the essence of man. That essence therefore (by I. xv.) issomething which is in God, and which without God can neither benor be conceived, whether it be a modification (I. xxv. Cor.),or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditionedmanner.

*****Note—Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or beconceived without God. All men agree that God is the one andonly cause of all things, both of their essence and of theirexistence; that is, God is not only the cause of things inrespect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also inrespect to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thingcannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of thatthing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of Godappertains to the essence of created things, or else that createdthings can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is moreprobably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I thinkthe cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep tothe proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God,which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior bothin the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they havetaken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into thefirst place what they call the objects of sensation; hence,while they are considering natural phenomena, they give noattention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards theyapply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they arequite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with whichthey have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuchas such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divinenature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that thesepersons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only togive a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thingcannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet Goddoes not appertain to their essence. I said that "I consideredas belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, thething is necessarily removed also; or that without which thething, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor beconceived." (II. Def. ii.)

XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of thehuman mind, is the idea of some particular thing actuallyexisting.

>>>>>Proof—The essence of man (by the Cor. of the last Prop.) isconstituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea isgiven, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is priorin nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the humanmind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.viii. Cor.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it musttherefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not ofan infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), mustalways necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve anabsurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes theactual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actuallyexisting. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows, that the human mind is part ofthe infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the humanmind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God hasthis or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so faras he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or inso far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and whenwe say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as heconstitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far ashe, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea ofanother thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thingin part or inadequately.

*****Note—Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, andwill call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, andnot to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to theend.

XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, whichconstitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind,or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of thesaid occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constitutingthe human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that bodywithout being perceived by the mind.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Cor.), inso far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the saidobject, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mindof anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the objectconstituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereofis necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence ofthe human mind; that is (by II. xi. Cor.) the knowledge of thesaid thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words themind perceives it.

*****Note—This proposition is also evident, and is more clearlyto be understood from II. vii., which see.

XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is thebody, in other words a certain mode of extension which actuallyexists, and nothing else.

>>>>>Proof—If indeed the body were not the object of the humanmind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be inGod (II. ix. Cor.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, butin virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is(II. xi. Cor.) the ideas of the modifications of the body wouldnot be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the ideaof the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of theidea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as itactually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any otherobject of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, asnothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of ourmind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

*****Note—We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind isunited to the body, but also the nature of the union betweenmind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp thisadequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledgeof the nature of our body. The propositions we have advancedhitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to menthan to other individual things, all of which, though indifferent degrees, are animated (animata). For of everythingthere is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause,in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thuswhatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body mustnecessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, likeobjects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent thananother and containing more reality, just as the object of oneidea is more excellent than the object of another idea, andcontains more reality.

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differsfrom other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it isnecessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, ofthe human body. What this nature is, I am not able here toexplain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,that I should do so. I will only say generally, that inproportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doingmany actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also isthe mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others forforming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actionsof the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodiesconcur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of whichit is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thusrecognize the superiority of one mind over others, and mayfurther see the cause, why we have only a very confusedknowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which Iwill, in the following propositions, deduce from what has beenadvanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explainand prove more strictly my present statements. In order to doso, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature ofbodies.

—-Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

—-Axiom II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,sometimes more quickly.

Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect ofmotion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect ofsubstance.

>>>>>Proof—The first part of this proposition is, I take it,self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect ofsubstance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is broughtout still more clearly from I. xv., Note.

Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain respects.

>>>>>Proof—All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve theconception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or morequickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined tomotion or rest by another body, which other body has beendetermined to motion or rest by a third body, and that thirdagain by a fourth, and so on to infinity.

>>>>>Proof—Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which(Lemma i.) are distinguished one from the other in respect tomotion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily bedetermined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely(II. vi.) by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) inmotion or at rest. And this body again can only have been setin motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third bodyto motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so onto infinity. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps inmotion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some otherbody; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to astate of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident.For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is atrest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that itis at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for noother consequence could have been involved than its remaining atrest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, solong as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anythingconcerning it, except that it is in motion. If A issubsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the resultof A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led tocontinued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resultedfrom something, which was not in A, namely, from an externalcause determining A to a state of rest.

——-Axiom I—All modes, wherein one body is affected by anotherbody, follow simultaneously from the nature of the bodyaffected and the body affecting; so that one and the same bodymay be moved in different modes, according to the difference inthe nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, differentbodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

——-Axiom II—When a body in motion impinges on another body atrest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order tocontinue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion inthe recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the movingbody has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the lineof motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,which are only distinguished one from the other by motion andrest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compoundbodies.

Definition—When any given bodies of the same or differentmagnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, orif they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, sothat their mutual movements should preserve among themselves acertain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are 'in union,'and that together they compose one body or individual, which isdistinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

——-Axiom III—In proportion as the parts of an individual, ora compound body, are in contact over a greater or lesssuperficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit ofbeing moved from their position; consequently the individualwill, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to assumeanother form. Those bodies, whose parts are in contact overlarge superficies, are called 'hard;' those, whose parts are incontact over small superficies, are called 'soft;' those, whoseparts are in motion among one another, are called 'fluid.'

Lemma IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of severalbodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same time,an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take theirplace, the individual will preserve its nature as before, withoutany change in its actuality (forma).

>>>>>Proof—Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect ofsubstance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of anindividual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; butthis union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substanceand in respect of mode. Q.E.D.

Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater orless, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the samemutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will stillpreserve its original nature, and its actuality will not bechanged.

>>>>>Proof—The same as for the last Lemma.

Lemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelledto change the motion, which they have in one direction, formotion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they beable to continue their motions and their mutual communication inthe same relations as before, the individual will retain its ownnature without any change of its actuality.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is self-evident, for the individualis supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, wespoke of as its actual being.

Lemma VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preservesits nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest,whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as eachpart retains its motion, and preserves its communication withother parts as before.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from the definition of anindividual prefixed to Lemma iv.

*****Note—We thus see, how a composite individual may beaffected in many different ways, and preserve its naturenotwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual ascomposed of bodies only distinguished one from the other inrespect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, ofbodies of the most simple character. If, however, we nowconceive another individual composed of several individuals ofdiverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in whichit can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatlymultiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies,and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would admit, withoutchange to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and wouldconsequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a thirdkind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind,we shall find that they may be affected in a still greaternumber of ways without changing their actuality. We may easilyproceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature asone individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary ininfinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point atmore length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. ButI have already said that such is not my object; I have onlytouched on the question, because it enables me to prove easilythat which I have in view.

POSTULATES I. The human body is composed of a number ofindividual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is initself extremely complex.

II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some arefluid, some soft, some hard.

III. The individual parts composing the human body, andconsequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety ofways by external bodies.

IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of anumber of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,regenerated.

V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by anexternal body to impinge often on another soft part, it changesthe surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves theimpression thereupon of the external body which impels it.

VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them ina variety of ways.

PROPOSITIONS XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving agreat number of things, and is so in proportion as its body iscapable of receiving a great number of impressions.

>>>>>Proof—The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected invery many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very manyways of affecting external bodies. But (II.xii.) the human mindmust perceive all that takes place in the human body; the humanmind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number ofthings, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.

XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the humanmind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

>>>>>Proof—The idea constituting the actual being of the humanmind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) iscomposed of a great number of complex individual parts. Butthere is necessarily in God the idea of each individual partwhereof the body is composed (II. viii. Cor.); therefore (II.vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of each of thesenumerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body isaffected by external bodies, must involve the nature of thehuman body, and also the nature of the external body.

>>>>>Proof—All the modes, in which any given body is affected,follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from thenature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Cor. of Lemmaiii.), wherefore their idea is also necessarily (by I, Ax. iv.)involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of everymode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies,involves the nature of the human body and of the external body.Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I.—Hence it follows, first, that the human mindperceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with thenature of its own.

<<<<<Corollary II.—It follows, secondly, that the ideas, whichwe have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution ofour own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amplyillustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involvesthe nature of any external body, the human mind will regard thesaid external body as actually existing, or as present toitself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as toexclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is self-evident, for so long as thehuman body continues to be thus affected, so long will the humanmind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body —that is(by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode asactually existing, and this idea involves the nature of theexternal body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Cor. i.) willregard the external body as actually existing, until it isaffected, &c. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—The mind is able to regard as present externalbodies, by which the human body has once been affected, eventhough they be no longer in existence or present.

>>>>>Proof—When external bodies determine the fluid parts of thehuman body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, theychange the surface of the last named (Post. v); hence (Ax. ii.,after the Cor. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in adifferent manner from that which they followed before suchchange; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the newsurfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will berefracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelledtowards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, theywill, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the humanbody in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will againtake cognizance —that is (II. xvii.), the mind will againregard the external body as present, and will do so, as often asthe fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaidsurfaces by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, althoughthe external bodies, by which the human body has once beenaffected, be no longer in existence, the mind will neverthelessregard them as present, as often as this action of the body isrepeated. Q.E.D.

*****Note—We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,that we regard as present many things which are not. It ispossible that the same result may be brought about by othercauses; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated onepossible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out thetrue cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from thetruth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, whichrest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot becontroverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the humanbody, as we feel it, exists (Cor. after II. xiii.). Furthermore(II. vii. Cor., II. xvi. Cor. ii.), we clearly understand what isthe difference between the idea, say, of Peter, whichconstitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of thesaid Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The formerdirectly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and onlyimplies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicatesrather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts,Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even thoughhe no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology,the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas representexternal bodies as present to us, we will call the images ofthings, though they do not recall the figure of things. Whenthe mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicatewhere error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked atin themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err inthe mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regardedas being without the idea, which excludes the existence of suchthings as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, whileimagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the sametime conscious that they do not really exist, this power ofimagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, andnot to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination dependsolely on its own nature—that is (I. Def. vii.), if thisfaculty of imagination be free.

XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or morebodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines anyof them, it will straightway remember the others also.

>>>>>Proof—The mind (II. xvii. Cor.) imagines any given body,because the human body is affected and disposed by theimpressions from an external body, in the same manner as it isaffected when certain of its parts are acted on by the saidexternal body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then sodisposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, andthe mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember theother. Q.E.D.

*****Note—We now clearly see what 'Memory' is. It is simply acertain association of ideas involving the nature of thingsoutside the human body, which association arises in the mindaccording to the order and association of the modifications(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is anassociation of those ideas only, which involve the nature ofthings outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to thenature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of thehuman body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those whichinvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.I say, secondly, that this association arises according to theorder and association of the modifications of the human body, inorder to distinguish it from that association of ideas, whicharises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mindperceives things through their primary causes, and which is inall men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand,why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightwayarrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similaritywith the first; for instance, from the thought of the word'pomum' (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at thethought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with thearticulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it,except that the body of the man has often been affected by thesetwo things; that is, that the man has often heard the word'pomum,' while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every manwill go on from one thought to another, according as his habithas ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier,for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, willat once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of ahorseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while acountryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to thethought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will followthis or that train of thought, according as he has been in thehabit of conjoining and associating the mental images of thingsin this or that manner.

XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does notknow it to exist, save through the ideas of the modificationswhereby the body is affected.

>>>>>Proof—The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of thehuman body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far ashe is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thingactually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human bodystands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideasis the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regardedas affected by the ideas of very many particular things. ThusGod has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, inso far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in sofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (byII. xi. Cor.), the human mind does not know the human body. Butthe ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far ashe constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mindperceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II.xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; thereforethe mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.

XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,following in God in the same manner, and being referred to Godin the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

>>>>>Proof—Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both ofthought itself and of all its modifications, consequently alsoof the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge ofthe mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individualthing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection ofideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and isreferred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge ofthe body. Q.E.D.

XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same wayas the mind is united to the body.

>>>>>Proof—That the mind is united to the body we have shownfrom the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii.and xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind mustbe united with its object, that is, with the mind in the samemanner as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This proposition is comprehended much more clearlyfrom what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showedthat the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II.xiii.), are one and the same individual conceived now under theattribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension;wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one andthe same thing, which is conceived under one and the sameattribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, andthe mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow fromhim from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, theidea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing butthe distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it isconceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object;if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that heknows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knowsit, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.

XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of thebody, but also the ideas of such modifications.

>>>>>Proof—The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in Godin the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in thesame way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of thebody are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in sofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; thereforethe ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has theknowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), theywill be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives notonly the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of suchmodifications. Q.E.D.

XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as itperceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

>>>>>Proof—The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) followsin God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the samemanner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (II. xi. Cor.), since the knowledge of the human body is notreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of thehuman mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mindreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of thehuman mind; therefore (by the same Cor. II. xi.), the human mindthus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of themodifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the natureof the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), theyagree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge ofthese ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but (bythe last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the humanmind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only hasknowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge ofthe parts composing the human body.

>>>>>Proof—The parts composing the human body do not belong tothe essence of that body, except in so far as they communicatetheir motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded asindividuals without relation to the human body. The parts ofthe human body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whoseparts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without inany way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of thelatter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., afterLemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.iii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another ideaof a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in theorder of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirmthe same thing of each part of each individual composing thehuman body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing thehuman body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very manyideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of thehuman body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes thenature of the human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Cor.),the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of thehuman body. Q.E.D.

XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does notinvolve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

>>>>>Proof—We have shown that the idea of a modification of thehuman body involves the nature of an external body, in so far asthat external body conditions the human body in a given manner.But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which hasno reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof isin God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected bythe idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally priorto the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge ofthe external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea ofthe modification of the human body; in other words, the idea ofthe modification of the human body does not involve an adequateknowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body asactually existing, except through the ideas of the modificationsof its own body.

>>>>>Proof—If the human body is in no way affected by a givenexternal body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the humanbody, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by theidea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it inany manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the humanbody is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far(II. xvi. and Cor.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—In so far as the human mind imagines an externalbody, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

>>>>>Proof—When the human mind regards external bodies throughthe ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that itimagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagineexternal bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not anadequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does notinvolve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

>>>>>Proof—Every idea of a modification of the human bodyinvolves the nature of the human body, in so far as the humanbody is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). Butinasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affectedin many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.Q.E.D.

XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in sofar as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clearand distinct, but confused.

>>>>>Proof—The ideas of the modifications of the human bodyinvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the humanbody but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (byII. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, asalso of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, inso far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but inso far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideasof modifications, in so far as they are referred to the humanmind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in otherwords, confused ideas. Q.E.D.

*****Note—The idea which constitutes the nature of the humanmind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when consideredin itself and alone, clear and distinct; as also is the casewith the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas ofthe modifications of the human body, in so far as they arereferred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the humanbody does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

>>>>>Proof—The idea of a modification of the human body (II.xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mindadequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea doesnot adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does notinvolve an adequate knowledge thereof.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that the human mind, when itperceives things after the common order of nature, has not anadequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge ofitself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the minddoes not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideasof the modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceivesits own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications ofbody (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.)through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceivesexternal bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it hassuch ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge ofitself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor ofexternal bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confusedknowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note). Q.E.D.

*****Note—I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate butonly a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and ofexternal bodies, whenever it perceives things after the commonorder of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from without,namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard thisor that; not at such times as it is determined from within, thatis, by the fact of regarding several things at once, tounderstand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast.Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it regardsthings clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the durationof our body.

>>>>>Proof—The duration of our body does not depend on itsessence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operateby causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist andoperate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, theselast again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order ofnature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing maybe constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far ashe has the idea of the human body only (II. ix. Cor.).Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in Godvery inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constitutingthe nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Cor.), thisknowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of theduration of particular things external to ourselves.

>>>>>Proof—Every particular thing, like the human body, must beconditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate ina fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing mustlikewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity (I.xxviii.). As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, fromthis common property of particular things, we have only a veryinadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw asimilar conclusion with regard to the duration of particularthings, namely, that we can only have a very inadequateknowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that all particular things arecontingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea oftheir duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we mustunderstand by the contingency and perishableness of things (I.xxxiii., Note i.). For (I. xxix.), except in this sense,nothing is contingent.

XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, aretrue.

>>>>>Proof—All ideas which are in God agree in every respectwith their objects (II. ii. Cor.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) theyare all true. Q.E.D.

XXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them tobe called false.

>>>>>Proof—If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positivemode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctivequality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God(II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I.xv.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causesthem to be called false. Q.E.D.

XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate andperfect, is true.

>>>>>Proof—When we say that an idea in us is adequate andperfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that the idea isadequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes theessence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that suchan idea is true. Q.E.D.

XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, whichinadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

>>>>>Proof—There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes themto be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist insimple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and tobe mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, forignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists inthe privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, orconfused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

*****Note—In the note to II. xvii. I explained how errorconsists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throwmore light on the subject I will give an example. For instance,men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion ismade up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance ofthe causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea offreedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause fortheir actions. As for their saying that human actions depend onthe will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspondthereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they noneof them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feigndwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provokeeither laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the factthat, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's truedistance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwardslearn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred ofthe earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to benear; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we areignorant of its true distance, but because the modification ofour body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our saidbody is affected thereby.

XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the samenecessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

>>>>>Proof—All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as theyare referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Cor.)adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. andxxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.

XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), andwhich is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitutethe essence of any particular thing.

>>>>>Proof—If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that itconstitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without Beither exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does itconstitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.

XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which areequally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived exceptadequately.

>>>>>Proof—Let A be something, which is common to all bodies,and which is equally present in the part of any given body andin the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.vii. Cor.), both in so far as God has the idea of the humanbody, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modificationsof the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in partthe nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies;that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily beadequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and inso far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.Therefore the mind (II. xi. Cor.) necessarily perceives Aadequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far asit perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own orany external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that there are certain ideas ornotions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agreein certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must beadequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human bodyand such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, andwhich is present equally in each part of either, or in thewhole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

>>>>>Proof—If A be that, which is common to and a property ofthe human body and external bodies, and equally present in thehuman body and in the said external bodies, in each part of eachexternal body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea ofA in God (II. vii. Cor.), both in so far as he has the idea ofthe human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the givenexternal bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body isaffected by an external body through that, which it has in commontherewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involvethe property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Cor.) theidea of this modification, in so far as it involves the propertyA, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by theidea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as heconstitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.Cor.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that the mind is fitted toperceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body hasmore in common with other bodies.

XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which aretherein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is self-evident. For when we saythat an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which aretherein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that anidea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not inso far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by theideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as heconstitutes the essence of the human mind.

*****Note I—I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,which are common to all men, and which form the basis of ourratiocinations. But there are other causes of certain axioms ornotions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by thismethod of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are moreuseful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use atall. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to allmen, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those whoare unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those whichare ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notionscalled "secondary" derived their origin, and consequently theaxioms on which they are founded, and other points of interestconnected with these questions. But I have decided to pass overthe subject here, partly because I have set it aside for anothertreatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader bytoo great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omitanything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down thecauses, whence are derived the terms styled "transcendental,"such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from thefact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable ofdistinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image isI explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the sametime; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to beconfused; if this number of images, of which the body is capableof forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, allwill become entirely confused one with another. This being so,it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that thehuman mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,as its body can form images simultaneously. When the imagesbecome quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines allbodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehendthem, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under theattribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawnfrom the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and fromother analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us toconsider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these termsrepresent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similarcauses arise those notions, which we call "general," such asman, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that somany images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously inthe human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, notindeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count ofsmall differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.)and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, inwhich all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected bythem, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the saidindividuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses bythe name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number ofparticular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable toimagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by allmen in the same way, but vary in each individual according asthe point varies, whereby the body has been most often affectedand which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. Forinstance, those who have most often regarded with admiration thestature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal oferect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard someother attribute, will form a different general image of man, forinstance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animalwithout feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,everyone will form general images of things according to thehabit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, whoseek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed ofthem, so many controversies should have arisen.

*****Note II—From all that has been said above it is clear, thatwe, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:—(1.)From particular things represented to our intellectfragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses(II. xxix. Cor.); I have settled to call such perceptions by thename of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.)From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heardcertain words we remember things and form certain ideasconcerning them, similar to those through which we imaginethings (II. xviii. Note). I shall call both these ways ofregarding things "knowledge of the first kind," "opinion," or"imagination." (3.) From the fact that we have notions commonto all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II.xxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call "reason"and "knowledge of the second kind." Besides these two kinds ofknowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind ofknowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledgeproceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence ofcertain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of theessence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds ofknowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given forfinding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second isto the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the secondby the third, and divide the product by the first; eitherbecause they have not forgotten the rule which they receivedfrom a master without any proof, or because they have often madetrial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof ofthe nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid,namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. Forinstance, one, two, three being given, everyone can see that thefourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, becausewe infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of theratio, which the first bears to the second.

XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

>>>>>Proof—To knowledge of the first kind we have (in theforegoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequateand confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the onlysource of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to thesecond and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which areadequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.xxxiv.). Q.E.D.

XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge ofthe first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from thefalse.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows howto distinguish between true and false, must have an adequateidea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he mustknow the true and the false by the second or third kind ofknowledge.

XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he hasa true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thingperceived.

>>>>>Proof—A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate inGod, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of thehuman mind (II. xi. Cor.). Let us suppose that there is in God,in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequateidea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II.xx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But theidea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he isdisplayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of theidea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (byII. xi. Cor.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in themind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has anadequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at thesame time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of hisknowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.

*****Note—I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant bythe idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoingproposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has atrue idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highestcertainty. For to have a true idea is only another expressionfor knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea issomething lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode ofthinking—namely, the very act of understanding. And who, Iask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do firstunderstand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure ofa thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, whatcan there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as astandard of truth? Even as light displays both itself anddarkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered thesequestions—namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a falseidea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, atrue idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have anyadvantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comesit that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,that he has ideas which agree with their objects? Thesequestions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficientlyanswered. The difference between a true idea and a false ideais plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former isrelated to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes offalsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.with the note. From what is there stated, the differencebetween a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only falseideas, is made apparent. As for the last question—as to how aman can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects,I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that hisknowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea whichcorresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is itsown standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as itperceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of themind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.

XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things ascontingent, but as necessary.

>>>>>Proof—It is in the nature of reason to perceive thingstruly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are inthemselves—that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but asnecessary. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary I—Hence it follows, that it is only through ourimagination that we consider things, whether in respect to thefuture or the past, as contingent.

*****Note—How this way of looking at things arises, I willbriefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Cor.) thatthe mind always regards things as present to itself, even thoughthey be not in existence, until some causes arise which excludetheir existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showedthat, if the human body has once been affected by two externalbodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines oneof the said external bodies, will straightway remember theother—that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unlessthere arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact thatwe imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, somemore quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that achild yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paulat noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he againsees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II. Prop.xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he willimagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, asit did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, hewill imagine a complete day, and, together with his imaginationof the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he willimagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon—that is,he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to afuture time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening,he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining themsimultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If itshould at any time happen, that on some other evening the childshould see James instead of Simon, he will, on the followingmorning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimesSimon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child issupposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, notboth together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, withthe imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one,then the other—that is, he will imagine them in the future,neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. Thiswavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imaginationbe concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing inrelation to time past or time present: consequently, we mayimagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to timepresent, past, or future.

<<<<<Corollary II—It is in the nature of reason to perceivethings under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatisspecie).

>>>>>Proof—It is in the nature of reason to regard things, notas contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceivesthis necessity of things (II. xli.) truly—that is (I. Ax. vi.),as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things isthe very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, itis in the nature of reason to regard things under this form ofeternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions(II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particularthing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation totime, under a certain form of eternity.

XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thingactually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infiniteessence of God.

>>>>>Proof—The idea of a particular thing actually existingnecessarily involves both the existence and the essence of thesaid thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot beconceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) theyhave God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under theattribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideasmust necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of theattributes of those ideas—that is (I. vi.), the eternal andinfinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

*****Note—By existence I do not here mean duration—that is,existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as acertain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature ofexistence, which is assigned to particular things, because theyfollow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternalnecessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat,of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they arein God. For although each particular thing be conditioned byanother particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the forcewhereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows fromthe eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).

XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of Godwhich every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

>>>>>Proof—The proof of the last proposition is universal; andwhether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the ideathereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essenceof God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in thewhole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.

XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternaland infinite essence of God.

>>>>>Proof—The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) andexternal bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actuallyexisting; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequateknowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Hence we see, that the infinite essence and theeternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infermany things, which we may adequately know, and we may form thatthird kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall haveoccasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledgeof God as they have of general notions, because they are unableto imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they haveassociated the name God with images of things that they are inthe habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,being, as they are, men, and continually affected by externalbodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head,namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. Forinstance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centreof a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at allevents, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle differentfrom that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men makemistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in theirmind, and another on the paper. If we could see into theirminds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, becausewe think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as theyhave on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believethem to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was inerror, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall hadflown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to mesufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from thefact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do notrightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter offact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now oneside, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose theopinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in theiropponents.

XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but themind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which hasalso been determined by another cause, and this last by anothercause, and so on to infinity.

>>>>>Proof—The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.xvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolutefaculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) itmust be determined by a cause, which has also been determined byanother cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note—In the same way it is proved, that there is in themind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are eitherentirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,such as we are accustomed to put together from particularthings. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the samerelation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as"lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter andPaul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free hasbeen set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceedfurther, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm anddecide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat,the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true orfalse, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turnsaway from any given thing. After we have proved, that thesefaculties of ours are general notions, which cannot bedistinguished from the particular instances on which they arebased, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anythingbesides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whetherthere is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On whichsubject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lestthe idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I donot mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or inthe midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.

XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation andnegation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,involves.

>>>>>Proof—There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positiveor negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely,this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let usconceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinkingwhereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of atriangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmationinvolves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, withoutthe idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the samething to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, asit is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the ideaof a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be norbe conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this ideaof a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, thatits three interior angles are equal to two right angles.Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither benor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, thisaffirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition(inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of anyother volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Will and understanding are one and the same.

>>>>>Proof—Will and understanding are nothing beyond theindividual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But aparticular volition and a particular idea are one and the same(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding areone and the same. Q.E.D.

*****Note—We have thus removed the cause which is commonlyassigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsityconsists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideaswhich are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When wesay, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that hehas no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in whatis false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should causehis imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, althoughthe man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall neversay that he is certain. For by certainty we mean somethingpositive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fullyexplained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, andI will furthermore answer the objections which may be advancedagainst our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,I have thought it worth while to point out some of theadvantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they willbe better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifthpart.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to makean accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of themind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is furthernecessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,whereby we signify things. These three—namely, images, words,and ideas—are by many persons either entirely confusedtogether, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutelynecessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both forphilosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Thosewho think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us bycontact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideasof those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are notideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree ofour will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimatepictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do notsee that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves anaffirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words withideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, thinkthat they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it inno wise involves the conception of extension, will thereforeclearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) doesnot consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essenceof words and images is put together by bodily motions, which inno wise involve the conception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice: I will thereforepass on to consider the objections, which may be raised againstour doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, whothink that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, andthat therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for theirholding the belief, that the will has wider scope than theunderstanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of anincrease in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation ornegation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which wedo not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in theirfaculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished fromthe intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach usespecially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgmentbefore assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmedby the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as heperceives anything, but only in so far as he assents ordissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not thereforeadmit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived,unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,than that the will or faculty of assent is free and differentfrom the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objectedthat one affirmation does not apparently contain more realitythan another; in other words, that we do not seem to need foraffirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than foraffirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seenthat one idea has more reality or perfection than another, foras objects are some more excellent than others, so also are theideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seemsto point to a difference between the understanding and the will.Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from freewill, what will happen if the incentives to action are equallybalanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish ofhunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would thendetermine his own action, and would consequently possess thefaculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objectionsmight also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidenceeverything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to thetask of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly aspossible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has awider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding bemeant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the willhas a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty offorming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volitionshould be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm aninfinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannotaffirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, bythe same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) aninfinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is aninfinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still beurged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceivethem, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty ofperception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we havealready. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bringit about that we should understand an infinite number of otherentities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greaterunderstanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than thatwhich we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, wherebywe explain all particular volitions—in other words, that whichis common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common oruniversal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to bewondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itselfinto the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: forwhat is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of aninfinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a freepower of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyonesuspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he doesnot perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension ofjudgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and notfree will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose aboy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch asthis imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.Cor.), and the boy does not perceive anything which wouldexclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regardthe horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of itsexistence, although he be not certain thereof. We have dailyexperience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do notsuppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while heis dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgmentconcerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about thathe should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees;yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspendour judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actualperception extends—that is, I grant that the mind'simaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act ofperception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception ofa winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If themind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it wouldregard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasonsfor doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unlessthe imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea whichprecludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mindperceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse isinadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny theexistence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt onthe subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,namely, that the will is something universal which is predicatedof all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common toall ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, bein every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all,not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea'sessence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differone from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, theaffirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs fromthat which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the ideaof a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal powerof thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and toaffirm that that which is false is true. These twoaffirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation toone another as being and not-being; for there is nothingpositive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality offalsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when weconfuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reasonand abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, Iam quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibriumdescribed (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant fromhim) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; Ianswer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man shouldbe considered, who hangs himself, or how we should considerchildren, fools, madmen, &c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of thisdoctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gatheredfrom what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to thedecree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and somuch the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more andmore understand God. Such a doctrine not only completelytranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highesthappiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge ofGod, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bidus. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a trueestimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by Godwith high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, asfor having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and theservice of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselveswith respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are notin our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it showsus, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frownswith an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from theeternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows fromthe essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to tworight angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us tohate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to beangry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should becontent with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from anywomanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by theguidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand,as I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on thecommonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed andled, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely dowhatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of thisnote, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to aclose. I think I have therein explained the nature andproperties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficientclearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised manyexcellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessaryto be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

END OF PART II

End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part II], by Benedict de Spinoza